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ABSTRACT
This paper studies optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital with private information and multiple
assets.  Entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem and entrepreneurs face
idiosyncratic capital risk.  We first characterize the optimal allocation subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints resulting from the private information.  The optimal tax system implements such an allocation
as a competitive equilibrium for a given market structure.  We consider several market structures that
differ in the assets or contracts traded and obtain three novel results.  First, differential asset taxation
is optimal. Marginal taxes on bonds depend on the correlation of their returns with idiosyncratic capital
risk, which determines their hedging value.  Entrepreneurial capital always receives a subsidy relative
to other assets in the bad states.  Second, if entrepreneurs are allowed to sell equity, the optimal tax
system embeds a prescription for double taxation of capital income â at the firm level and at the
investor level.  Finally, we show that taxation of assets is essential even with competitive insurance
contracts, when entrepreneurial portfolios are also unobserved.
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A basic tenet in the corporate nance literature is that incentive problems due to infor-
mational frictions play a central role in entrepreneurial activity. Empirical evidence on
nancing and ownership patterns provides strong support for this view. Given that en-
trepreneurial capital accounts for at least 40% of household wealth in the US economy1,
understanding the properties of optimal taxes on entrepreneurial capital with private in-
formation is of essential interest to macroeconomics and public nance. This paper sets
forth to pursue this goal.
Our main assumption is that entrepreneurial activity is subject to a dynamic moral
hazard problem. Specically, expected returns to capital positively depend on an entrepre-
neurs e¤ort, which is private information. Entrepreneurial capital returns and investment
are observable. The dependence of returns on e¤ort implies that capital is agent specic
and generates idiosyncratic capital risk. This structure of the moral hazard problem en-
compasses a variety of more specic models studied in the corporate nance literature.
The approach used to derive the optimal tax system builds on the seminal work of Mir-
rlees (1971), and extends it to a dynamic setting. First, we characterize the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation, which solves a planning problem subject to the incentive compatibility
constraints resulting from the private information. We then construct a tax system that
implements such an allocation as a competitive equilibrium. The only a priori restriction
is that taxes must depend on observables. The resulting tax system optimizes the trade-o¤
between insurance and incentives.2
The paper studies scal implementation of optimal allocations in a variety of market
structures, allowing for multiple assets and private insurance contracts. This is our main
contribution. The properties of the optimal capital income taxes depend on the e¤ects
of asset holdings on incentives. Private information implies that the optimal allocation
displays a positive wedge between the aggregate return to capital and the entrepreneurs
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.3 However, this aggregate intertemporal wedge
is not related to the entrepreneursincentives to exert e¤ort, since the individual intertem-
poral rate of transformation di¤ers from the aggregate. Hence, we introduce the notion of
an individual intertemporal wedge, which properly accounts for the agent specic nature
of entrepreneurial capital returns. We show that the individual intertemporal wedge can
be positive or negative. The intuition for this result is simple. More capital increases an
entrepreneurs consumption in the bad states, which provides insurance and undermines
1Entrepreneurs are typically identied with households who hold equity in a private business and play
an active role in the management of this business. Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) document, based on the
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), that entrepreneurs account for 11.5% of the population and they hold
41.6% of total household wealth. Using the PSID, Quadrini (1999) documents that entrepreneurial assets
account for 46% of household wealth. Moscowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) identify entrepreneurial
capital with private equity, and they document that its value is similar in magnitude to public equity from
SCF data.
2This recent literature is summarized in Kocherlakotas (2005a) excellent review.
3Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) show that this wedge is positive for a large class of private
information economies with idiosyncratic labor risk.
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incentives. On the other hand, expected capital returns are increasing in entrepreneurial
e¤ort. This e¤ect relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint and dominates when the
spread in capital returns is su¢ ciently large or when the variability of consumption across
states is small at the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
To study optimal taxes, we examine three di¤erent market structures. A market struc-
ture species the feasible trades between agents and the distribution of ownership rights and
information. These arrangements are treated as exogenous. A tax system implements the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation if such an allocation arises as the competitive equilibrium
under this tax system for the assumed market structure. In all of the market structures
we consider, the optimal marginal tax on entrepreneurial capital is increasing in earnings,
when the individual intertemporal wedge is negative, decreasing when it is positive. The
incentive e¤ects of capital provide the rationale for this result. When the intertemporal
wedge is negative (positive), more capital relaxes (tightens) the incentive compatibility con-
straint, and the optimal tax system encourages (discourages) entrepreneurs to hold more
capital by reducing (increasing) the after tax volatility of capital returns.
Entrepreneurs can trade bonds in the rst market structure we consider. We show
that the optimal tax system equates the after tax return on all assets in each state. The
optimal marginal tax on risk-free bonds is decreasing in entrepreneurial earnings, while the
optimal marginal taxes on risky securities depend on the correlation of their returns with
idiosyncratic risk. Entrepreneurial capital is subsidized relative to other assets in the bad
states. These predictions give rise to a novel theory of optimal di¤erential asset taxation.
While in this market structure the set of securities traded is exogenous, in the second
market structure, we allow entrepreneurs to sell shares of their capital and buy shares
of other entrepreneurs capital. Viewing each entrepreneur as a rm, this arrangement
introduces an equity market with a positive net supply of securities. The optimal tax
system then embeds a prescription for optimal double taxation of capital- at the rm level,
through the marginal tax on entrepreneurial earnings, and at the investor level, through
a marginal tax on stocks returns: Specically, it is necessary that the tax on earnings be
"passed on" to stock investors via a corresponding tax on dividend distributions to avoid
equilibria in which entrepreneurs sell all their capital to outside investors. In such equilibria,
an entrepreneur exerts no e¤ort and thus it is impossible to implement the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation. Since, in addition, marginal taxation of dividends received by outside
investors is necessary to preserve their incentives, earnings from entrepreneurial capital are
subject to double taxation.
The di¤erential tax treatment of nancial securities and the double taxation of capital
income in the United States and other countries have received substantial attention in the
empirical public nance literature, since they constitute a puzzle from the standpoint of
optimal taxation models that abstract from incentive problems.4 The optimal tax system
in our implementations is designed to ensure that entrepreneurs have the correct exposure
to their idiosyncratic capital risk to preserve incentive compatibility. Holdings of additional
assets a¤ect this exposure in a measure that depends on their correlation with entrepre-
neurial capital returns, and thus should be taxed accordingly. The ability to sell equity
4See Gordon and Slemrod (1988), Gordon (2003), Poterba (2002) and Auerbach (2002)
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introduces an additional channel through which entrepreneurs can modify their exposure to
idiosyncratic risk. A tax on dividend distributions is required to optimally adjust the im-
pact of a reduction in the entrepreneursownership stake on their exposure to idiosyncratic
risk. This explains the need for double taxation of capital.
Another important property of these implementations is that optimal marginal taxes
do not depend on the level of asset holdings. Consequently, entrepreneurial asset holdings
need not be known to the government to administer the optimal tax system, if assets are
traded via nancial intermediaries who collect taxes at the source, according to a schedule
prescribed by the government. This observation motivates the third market structure, in
which competitive insurance rms o¤er incentive compatible contracts to the entrepreneurs
and bonds are traded via nancial intermediaries. We assume that insurance companies
and the government cannot observe entrepreneurial portfolios. It follows that the optimal
insurance contracts do not implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation. We show that the
optimal marginal bond taxes relax the more severe incentive compatibility constraint in the
contracting problem between private insurance rms and entrepreneurs due to unobserved
bond trades and render the constrained-e¢ cient allocation feasible for that problem. Hence,
asset taxation is essential to implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, even without
informational advantages for the government. Under the optimal tax system, private insur-
ance contracts implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with observable consumption,
despite the fact that individual consumption remains private in equilibrium.
This nding has important implications for the role of tax policy in implementing op-
timal allocations. Even under the same informational constraints as private insurance
companies, the government can inuence the portfolio choices of entrepreneurs through
the tax system. This result is most closely related to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), who
analyze scal implementations in a Mirrleesian economy with hidden bond trades. They
focus on the optimal allocation with unobserved consumption and show that private in-
surance contracts do not implement such an allocation, because competitive insurance
contracts fail to internalize their e¤ect on the equilibrium bond price. A linear tax on
capital can ameliorate this externality. Here, instead, the optimal tax system implements
the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with observable consumption, despite the fact that in
the competitive equilibrium consumption is not observed.
This paper is related to the recent literature on dynamic optimal taxation with private
information. Albanesi and Sleet (2006) and Kocherlakota (2005b), focus on economies
with idiosyncratic risk in labor income and do not allow agents to trade more than one
asset. They show that the optimal marginal tax on capital income is decreasing in income
in economies with labor risk, and this property holds independently of the nature of the
asset. Farhi and Werning (2006) study optimal estate taxation in a dynastic economy
with private information. They nd that the aggregate intertemporal wedge is negative
if agents discount the future at a higher rate than the planner and that this implies the
optimal estate tax is progressive. Grochulski and Piskorski (2005) study optimal wealth
taxes in economies with risky human capital, where human capital and idiosyncratic skills
are private information. Cagetti and De Nardi (2004) explore the e¤ects of tax reforms in
a quantitative model of entrepreneurship with endogenous borrowing constraints. Finally,
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Angeletos (2006) studies competitive equilibrium allocations in a model with exogenously
incomplete markets and idiosyncratic capital risk. He nds that, if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is high enough, the steady state level of capital is lower than
under complete markets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 present the economy and studies constrained-
e¢ cient allocations and the incentive e¤ects of capital. Section 3 investigates optimal taxes.
Section 3 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of unit measure of entrepreneurs. All entrepre-
neurs are ex ante identical. They live for two periods and their lifetime utility is:
U = u (c0) + u (c1)  v (e) ;
where, ct denotes consumption in period t = 0; 1 and e denotes e¤ort exerted at time 0; with
e 2 f0; 1g. We assume  2 (0; 1) ; u0 > 0; u00 < 0; v0 > 0, v00 > 0; and limc!0 u0 (c) =1:
Entrepreneurs are endowed with K0 units of the consumption good at time 0 and can
operate an investment technology. If K1 is the amount invested at time 0; the return on
investment at time 1 is R (K1; x), where:
R (K1; x) = K1 (1 + x) ;
and x is the random net return on capital. The stochastic process for x is:
x =

x with probability  (e) ;
x with probability 1   (e) ; (1)
with x >x and  (1) >  (0) : The rst assumption implies that E1 (x) > E0 (x) ; where
Ee denotes the expectation operator for probability distribution  (e) : Hence, the expected
returns on capital is increasing in e¤ort.
We assume e¤ort is private information, while the realized value of x; as well as its
distribution, and K1 are public information. This implies that entrepreneurial activity is
subject to a dynamic moral hazard problem. The structure of the moral hazard problem
encompasses a variety of more specic cases studied in the corporate nance literature (see
Tirole, 2006), such as private benet taking or choice of projects with lower probability of
success that deliver benets in terms of perks or prestige to the entrepreneur. Moreover,
e¤ort can be thought as being exerted at time 0 or at time 1; before capital returns are
realized.
We characterize constrained-e¢ cient allocations for this economy by deriving the so-
lution to a particular planning problem. The planner maximizes each agents lifetime
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expected utility, conditional on the initial distribution of capital, by choice of a state con-
tingent consumption and e¤ort allocation. The planning problem is5:
fe; K1 ; c0; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g = arg max
e2f0;1g;K12[0;K0]; c0;c1(x)0
u (c0) + Eeu (c1 (x))  v (e)
(Problem 1)
subject to
c0 +K1  K0; Eec1 (x)  K1Ee (1 + x) ; (2)
E1u (c1 (x))  E0u (c1 (x))  v (1)  v (0) ; (3)
where Ee denotes the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution
 (e). The constraints in (2) stem from resource feasibility, while (3) is the incentive
compatibility constraint, arising from the unobservability of e¤ort. We will denote the
value of the optimized objective for Problem 1 with U (K0).


















= E1 (1 + x) ; (5)
where  > 0 is the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint (3).
Equation (4) implies that c1 (x) > c

1 (x)  there is partial insurance: Equation (5)
determines the intertemporal prole of constrained-e¢ cient consumption. Equation (5)
immediately implies:
u0 (c0) < E1 (1 + x)E1 [u
0 (c1 (x))] ;
by Jensens inequality. Hence, there is a wedge between the entrepreneurs intertempo-
ral marginal rate of substitution and the aggregate intertemporal rate of transformation,
which corresponds to E1 (1 + x) : Using the rst order necessary conditions for the planners
problem, this intertemporal wedge can be written as:
IW = E1 (1 + x)E1u0 (c1 (x))  u0 (c0) (6)
= E1 (1 + x) ( (1)   (0)) [u0 (c1 (x))  u0 (c1 (x))] > 0:
The presence of an intertemporal wedge in dynamic economies with private information
stems from the inuence of outstanding wealth on the agents attitude towards the risky
distribution of outcomes in subsequent periods, which in turn a¤ects incentives. The in-
tertemporal wedge is a measure of the incentive cost of transferring risk-free wealth with
5Given that the investment technology is linear in capital, the e¢ cient distribution of capital is degen-
erate, with one entrepreneur operating the entire economywide capital stock. Since this result is not robust
to the introduction of any degree of decreasing returns, and this in turn would not alter the structure of
the incentive problem, we simply assume that the planner cannot transfer initial capital across agents.
6
return E1 (1 + x) to a future period. In repeated moral hazard models, as shown in Roger-
son (1985), higher risk-free wealth always has an adverse e¤ect on incentives, because it
reduces the dependence of consumption on the realization of uncertainty, and therefore on
e¤ort. Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003) prove that this logic applies to a large
class of private information economies.
In this economy, however, entrepreneurial capital is agent specic and associated with
idiosyncratic risk in returns. Hence, the individual intertemporal rate of transformation is
given by the stochastic variable 1 + x; and does not correspond to E1 (1 + x) : It is then
useful to introduce the notion of an individual intertemporal wedge on entrepreneurial
capital, and compare it to the aggregate intertemporal wedge dened in (6).
We dene the individual intertemporal wedge as the di¤erence between the expected
discounted value of idiosyncratic capital returns and the marginal utility of current con-
sumption:
IWK = E1u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)  u0 (c0) : (7)
By (7) and the denition of covariance, it immediately follows that:
IWK = IW+ Cov1 (u0 (c1 (x)) ; x) : (8)
Equation (4) and strict concavity of utility imply: Cov1 (u0 (c1 (x)) ; x) < 0: Then, it follows
from equation (8) that IWK <IW and that the sign of IWK can be positive or negative.
The sign of the individual intertemporal wedge is related to the e¤ect of capital on
entrepreneurial incentives. An entrepreneurs marginal benet from increasing capital cor-
responds to the term E1u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) ; while her marginal cost is u
0 (c0) : A positive
value of IWK signals an additional shadow cost of increasing entrepreneurial capital- the
adverse e¤ect of increasing capital on incentives. By contrast, when IWK is negative, the
marginal benet of an additional unit of entrepreneurial capital is smaller than the entre-
preneurs marginal cost. This signals the presence of an additional shadow benet from
increasing capital. In this case, more capital in fact relaxes an entrepreneurs incentive
compatibility constraint.
These two opposing forces can clearly be seen by deriving IWK from the rst order
necessary conditions for Problem 1:
IWK =  ( (1)   (0))  [u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)  u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)] (9)
=  ( (1)   (0))  f[u0 (c1 (x))  u0 (c1 (x))] (1 + x)  (x  x)u0 (c1 (x))g :
The second line of equation (9) decomposes this wedge into a wealth e¤ect, which corre-
sponds to the rst term inside the curly brackets, and an opposing substitution e¤ect. The
wealth e¤ect captures the adverse e¤ect of capital on incentives, arising from the fact that
more capital increases consumption in the bad state. This provides insurance and tends to
reduce e¤ort for higher holdings of capital. The substitution e¤ect captures the positive
e¤ect of capital on incentives. This e¤ect is linked to the positive dependence of expected
capital returns on entrepreneurial e¤ort and tends to increase e¤ort at higher levels of cap-
ital. The size of the wealth e¤ect is positively related to the spread in consumption across
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states that drives the entrepreneursdemand for insurance. The strength of the substitu-
tion e¤ect depends on the spread in capital returns, which determines by how much the
expected return from capital increases under high e¤ort.
By a similar reasoning, the aggregate intertemporal wedge captures the incentive ef-
fects of increasing holdings of a risk-free asset with return equal to the expected return to
entrepreneurial capital, E1 (1 + x) : Clearly, by (6) the marginal benet is always greater
than the marginal cost, due to the fact that higher holdings of such an asset would reduce
the correlation between consumption and idiosyncratic capital returns, x; and tighten the
incentive compatibility constraint. This observation will play a role in the scal implemen-
tation of the optimal allocation. We will show in section 3.1 that the after tax return on
any risk free asset is equal to E1 (1 + x) in equilibrium: The di¤erential incentive e¤ects
of entrepreneurial capital and a riskless asset with the same expected return will lead to a
prescription of optimal di¤erential taxation of these assets.
2.1. A Su¢ cient Condition for IWK < 0
It is possible to derive an intuitive condition that guarantees a negative individual intertem-
poral wedge. This condition simply amounts to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion being
weakly smaller than 1: No additional restrictions on preferences or the returns process are
necessary.
To prove this result, we rst establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If fe; K1 ; c1(x); c1 (x)g solve Problem 1 and e = 1; then (1+x)K1  c1(x) >
c1(x)  (1 + x)K1 :
The lemma states that the variance of consumption is always smaller than the variance of
earnings at the constrained-e¢ cient allocation. We can then state the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let  (c)   cu00 (c) =u0 (c) denote the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
for the utility function u (c) : Then, IWK < 0 for  (c)  1:
This result can be understood drawing from portfolio theory. As shown in Gollier
(2001), the amount of holdings of an asset increase in the expected rate of return when the
substitution e¤ect dominates, for  (c) < 1: Since under high e¤ort the rate of return on
capital is higher than under low e¤ort, a similar intuition applies in this case.6
How relevant is this nding? The value of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is very
disputed, due to di¢ culties in estimation. Typical values of  (c) used in the macroeconomic
and nancial literature under constant relative risk aversion preferences largely exceed 1:
On the other hand, Chetty (2006) develops a new method for estimating this parameter
using data on labor supply behavior to bound the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. He
argues that for preferences that are separable in consumption and labor e¤ort,  (c)  1 is
6Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) and Sandmo (1970) study precautionary holdings of risky assets and
discuss similar e¤ects.
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the only empirically relevant case. This nding suggests that low values of  (c), relatively
to those used in macroeconomics, may be quite plausible.
Since Proposition 3 is merely su¢ cient, even if  (c) > 1; IWK can be negative for x x
large enough. In addition, for given variance of capital returns, it is more likely for IWK
to be negative when  (c) large, since when risk aversion is high the spread in consumption
across states at the optimal allocation will be small in this case. Hence, for  (c) > 1; the
sign of IWK is a quantitative question and data on the variance of entrepreneurial earnings
as well as information on risk aversion is required to provide an answer. In the next section,
we turn to some numerical examples to illustrate the possibilities.
2.2. Numerical Examples
To investigate the properties of optimal allocations in more detail, we now turn to numerical
examples. We assume u (c) = c
1  1
1  for  > 0 and v (e) = e;  > 0: Here,  corresponds
to the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and  is the cost of high e¤ort. We set K0 = 1 and
 = 0:08:We assume that the probability a high capital returns depends linearly on e¤ort,
according to  (e) = a+be; with a  0; b > 0 and 2a+b  1: The parameter b represents the
impact of e¤ort on capital returns. We consider values of a and b such that the standard
deviation of x under high and low e¤ort is equalized. This requires a = 0:25 and and
b = 0:5 and implies  (1) = 0:75 and  (0) = 0:25: Finally, we set E1x = 0:3:
We consider three examples. In the rst two, we x fx; xg and let  vary between
0:95 and 8: The spread in capital returns is greater in the rst example than in the second
example, leading to a standard deviation of x equal to 14% and 12%, respectively. In the
third example, we x  = 1:6 and let x vary between 0 and 0:0940 keeping E1x xed; so
that SD1 ranges from 0:17 to 0:12;7 where SDe denotes the standard deviation conditional
on e¤ort e:8 The parameters are summarized in Table 1.
7If we identify entrepreneurial capital with private equity, then x corresponds to the net returns on pri-
vate equity. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimate these returns using the Survey of Consumer
Finances. They nd that the average returns to private equity, including capital gains and earnings, are
12.3, 17.0 and 22.2 percent per year in the time periods 1990-1992, 1993-1995, 1996-1998. It is much harder
to estimate the variance of idiosyncratic returns. Evidence from distributions of entrepreneurial earnings,
conditional on survival, suggest that this variance is much higher than for public equity.
8The standard deviation of x conditional on high e¤ort is inversely related to x, for xed E1x:
9
Table 1: Numerical Examples
Parameters Example 1 Example 2 Example 3
 [0:95; 8] [0:95; 8] 1:6
x 0:05 0:094 [0; 0:094]
x 0:3833 0:3687 [0:3687; 0:40]
E1x 0:30 0:30 0:30
E0x 0:1333 0:1627 [0:10; 0:1627]
SD1 0:1443 0:1189 [0:12; 0:17]
 0:08 0:08 0:08
K0 1 1 1
a 0:25 0:25 0:25
b 0:5 0:5 0:5
Our ndings are displayed in gure 1. Each row corresponds to a di¤erent example.
The left panels display the individual intertemporal wedge (solid line) and the aggregate
intertemporal wedge (dashed line). The right panels display c0 (dashed line), c

1 (x) (solid
lines) in each state and earnings K1 (x) (dotted lines) in each state. In all examples, high
e¤ort is optimal for all parameter values reported.
In the rst two examples, the individual intertemporal wedge is non-monotonic in :
It is negative and rising in  for   1:6, it then declines and starts rising again for
 approximately equal to 4; converging to 0 from below. It is always negative for high
enough values of ; since the spread across states in optimal consumption decreases with
; for given spread in capital returns; which decreases the wealth e¤ect as illustrated by
equation (9).9 In the rst example, the individual intertemporal wedge is negative for all
values of ; while in the second example it is positive for values of  between 1:3 and 2:2:
This is due to the larger spread in capital returns is greater in example 1; which increases the
substitution e¤ect isolated in equation (9). The aggregate intertemporal wedge is always
positive, but is also displays a non monotonic pattern in  in both examples; initially
rising and then declining in this variable. It tends to 0 for high enough values of ; since
the spread in consumption across states is vanishingly small. For higher values of  than
the ones reported, the optimal e¤ort drops to 0: In that case, entrepreneurs are given full
insurance and there are no intertemporal wedges.
The third example  is xed at 1:6 -the value that maximizes IWK in examples 1 and
2- and the spread in capital returns is made to vary keeping the mean constant. All other
parameters are as in the previous examples. The individual intertemporal wedge monotoni-
cally decreases as the spread in capital returns rises, and turns negative for SD1 (x) greater
than 12:5%: The constrained-e¢ cient levels of consumption and capital, as well as the ag-
gregate intertemporal wedge, only depend on expected capital returns and do not vary with
the spread in capital returns.
9The fact that IWK starts rising for values of  greater than 4 is due to the fact that for   4; c1 (x)
is approximately costant, while c1 (x) continues to rise with : By (9), this causes IWK to rise.
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Figure 1: Constrained-e¢ cient allocations in three numerical examples.
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3. Optimal Taxes
We now consider how to implement constrained-e¢ cient allocations in a setting where
agents can trade in competitive markets. We explore di¤erent market structures. A market
structure species the distribution of ownership rights, the feasible trades between agents
and any additional informational assumptions beyond the primitive restrictions that com-
prise the physical environment. Agents are subject to taxes that inuence their budget
constraints. A tax system implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation if such an alloca-
tion arises as the competitive equilibrium outcome under this tax system for a particular
market structure. This requires that individuals nd that allocation optimal given the
tax system and prices, and that those prices satisfy market clearing. The optimal tax
system is the one that implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation. The only ex ante
constraint imposed on candidate tax systems is that the resulting taxes or transfers must
be conditioned only on individual characteristics that are observable.
The rst market structure we consider allows entrepreneurs to independently choose
capital and e¤ort, as well as trade nancial securities in zero net supply. These securities
are exogenously introduced and the implicit assumption is that they are costlessly issued.
We consider the case of a risk-free bond and also allow for the possibility that these securities
are contingent on idiosyncratic capital returns. In the second market structure, we allow
entrepreneurs to sell shares of their capital to outside investors giving rise to an equity
market. Since capital returns are i.i.d. across entrepreneurs it is also possible to form
risk-free portfolios. Both these market structures assume entrepreneurial portfolios to be
fully observable. In the last market structure, we allow for competitive insurance markets,
as well as nancial securities, and assume that the entrepreneurs total security holdings
are not observed by insurance companies or the government.
3.1. Optimal Di¤erential Asset Taxation
The rst market structure we consider is one in which agents can trade risk-free bonds
and independently choose investment as well as e¤ort at time 0: The risk-free bonds yield a
return r in period 1; which is determined in equilibrium. Decisions occur as follows. Agents
are endowed with initial capital K0 and choose K1 and bond purchases B1 at the beginning
of period 0; and they consume: They then exert e¤ort. At the beginning of period 1; x
is realized. Finally, the government collects taxes and agents consume: The informational
structure is as follows: K1 and x are public information, while e¤ort is private information.
We also assume that bond purchases B1 are public information. The tax system is given
by a time 1 transfer from the agents to the government which is conditional on observables
and represented by the function T (B1; K1; x) :We restrict attention to functions T that are
di¤erentiable almost everywhere in their rst argument and satisfy E1T (B1; K1; x) = 0;
which corresponds to the government budget constraint, given that the government does
not have any spending requirements.
An entrepreneurs problem is:n
e^; K^1; B^1
o
(B0; K0; T ) = arg max
K12[0;K0]; B1 B; e2f0;1g
U (e;K1; B1;T )  v (e) ; (Problem 3)
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where
U (e;K1; B1;T ) = u (K0 +B0  K1  B1) + Eeu (K1 (1 + x) +B1 (1 + r)  T (K1; B1; x)) ;
subject to K0+B0 K1 B1  0 and K1 (1 + x)+(1 + r)B1 T (B1; K1; x)  0 for x 2 X:
Here, the debt limit B is imposed to ensure that an agents problem is well dened. The
natural debt limit for tax systems in the class T (B1; K1; x) =  (x)+ B (x)B1+ K (x)K1
is B =   [K1(1+x K(x)) (x)]
1+r B(x) : This limit ensures that agents will be able to pay back all
outstanding debt in the low state. The initial bond endowment, B0; can be interpreted as
a transfer from the government to the entrepreneurs.
Denition 4. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation fc0; e;K1; B1; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g and
initial endowments B0 and K0 for the entrepreneurs; a tax system T (K1; B1; x) ; with
T : [ B;1) [0;1)fx; xg ! R; government bonds BG1 ; and an interest rate, r  0; such
that: i) given T and r and the initial endowments, the allocation solves Problem 3; ii) the
government budget constraint holds in each period; iii) the bond market clears, BG1 = B1.
The restriction on the domain of the tax system is imposed to ensure that the tax is
specied for all values of K1 and B1 feasible for the entrepreneurs. We now dene our
notion of implementation.
Denition 5. A tax system T : [ B;1) [0;1)fx; xg ! R implements the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation, if the allocation fc0; 1; K1 ; B1 ; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g ; the tax system T; jointly
with an interest rate r; government bonds BG1 ; and initial endowments B0 andK0 constitute
a competitive equilibrium.
We restrict attention to tax systems of the form: T (K1; B1; x) =  (x) + K (x)K1 +
B (x)B1: Let B1  B a level of bond holdings to be implemented. Since entrepreneurs
are all ex ante identical, if the government does not issue any bonds, B1 = B0 = 0 in any






We begin our characterization with a negative result and identify a tax systems in the
class T (K1; B1; x) that does not implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation. Let B0 and
T (K1 ; B

1 ; x) respectively satisfy:
c0 = B0 +K0  K1  B1 ; (10)
c1 (x) = K

1 (1 + x) + (1 + r)B

1   T (K1 ; B1 ; x) : (11)
10Our denition of competitive equilibrium allows the government to issue bonds at time 0; denoted
BG1 : The government budget constraints at time 0 and at time 1 are, respectively, B0   BG1  0 and
EeT (K1; B1; x)   BG1 (1 + r)  0; where e corresponds to the e¤ort chosen by the entrepreneurs in equi-
librium. Given that the government does not need to nance any expenditures, the amount of government
bonds issued does not inuence equilibrium consumption, capital and e¤ort allocations, or the equilibrium
interest rate. However, if the government did have an expenditure stream to nance, the choice of bond
holdings would be consequential.
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Then, K1 and B

1 are a¤ordable and, if they are chosen by an entrepreneur, incentive
compatibility implies that high e¤ort will also be chosen at time 1. Evaluating the entre-
preneursEuler equation at f1; K1 ; B1g ; we can write:
u0 (c0) = E1 [u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x  K (x))] ; (12)
u0 (c0) = E1 [u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + r   B (x))] : (13)
The restrictions on T (K1 ; B

1 ; x) implied by (10)-(11) and (12)-(13) do not fully pin
down the tax system and do not ensure that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is chosen
by an entrepreneur. To see this, let K (x) = K (x) = K and B (x) = B (x) = B, so
that marginal asset taxes do not depend on x; with K and B that satisfy (12)-(13): Then,
K has the same sign as the intertemporal wedge on capital, while B is always positive,
since the intertemporal wedge on the bond is positive. Set  (x) so that (11) holds under
K ; B, and let T (K1; B1; x) =  (x) + KK1 + BB1. It follows that:
u0 (c0) 7 E0 [u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x  K)] if IWK ? 0; (14)
u0 (c0) <  (1 + r   B)E0u0 (c1 (x)) : (15)
Since the incentive compatibility constraint is binding, these equations imply that if agents
could only invest in bonds, they would nd it optimal to choose bond holdings greater than
B1 and low e¤ort, while if they could only invest in capital they would nd it optimal to
choose low e¤ort and a level of capital lower/higher than K1 if the intertemporal wedge is
negative/positive. However, as shown in the following lemma, since entrepreneurs can invest
in both capital and bonds, the optimal deviation under T involves an extreme portfolio
choice. When the intertemporal wedge is negative, the optimal deviation under T is to set
entrepreneurial capital equal to 0:
Lemma 6. Under tax system T ; e^ = 0: If IWK > 0; B^1 =B and K^1 > K1 ; if IWK < 0;
K^1 = 0 and B^1 > B1 :
This lemma shows that rather than choose f1; K1 ; B1g ; which is a¤ordable and satises
rst order necessary conditions, entrepreneurs nd it optimal to choose low e¤ort and
adjust their portfolio under the tax system T (K1; B1; x). Hence, it does not implement the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation.11
We now construct a tax system that does implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
The critical properties of this system are that marginal asset taxes depend on observable
capital returns and that after tax returns are equalized across all assets, state by state.
11The result that non-state dependent marginal asset taxes allow for devations from the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation also holds in economies with idiosyncratic labor risk, as discussed in Albanesi and Sleet
(2006) and Kocherlakota (2005). Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) derive a related result in a disability
insurance model.
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Proposition 7. A tax system T  (B1; K1; x) =  (x) +  B (x)B1 + 

K (x)K1; with T
 :
[ B;1) [0;1) fx; xg ! R; and an initial bond endowment B0 that satisfy:








c1 (x) = K





0 +K0  K1  B1 ; (19)
ensure that the allocation fc0; 1; K1 ; B1 ; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g is optimal for entrepreneurs for some
B1  B and some r  0.
The proof proceeds in three steps. It rst shows that the only interior solution to the
entrepreneurs Euler equations are B1 and K

1 under T
; and that local second order condi-
tions are satised. It then shows that T  admits no corner solutions to the choice of K1 and
B1: Moreover, these results do not depend on the value of e¤ort used to compute expecta-
tions over time 1 outcomes. Then, K1 and B

1 are the unique solutions to an entrepreneurs
portfolio problem irrespective of the value of e¤ort that she might be contemplating. The
last step establishes than  (x) guarantees that, once K1 and B

1 ; have been chosen, high
e¤ort will be optimal.
The optimal tax system T  has two main properties. It removes the complementarity
between the choice of e¤ort and the choice of capital and bond holdings, thus removing
any incentive e¤ects of the entrepreneursasset choice. This guarantees that the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the joint global optimality of K1 and B

1 are satised at
all e¤ort levels. Moreover, T  equates after tax returns on all assets in each state. This
renders entrepreneurs indi¤erent over the composition of their portfolio. The next corollary
establishes that the tax system T  implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
Corollary 8. The tax system T  (K1; B1; x) and initial bond endowment B0 dened in
Proposition 7, jointly with the allocation fc0; 1; K1 ; B1 ; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g ; and government






1  B; a return r; constitute a competitive equilibrium for
the market economy with initial capital K0.
The following proposition characterizes the properties of the optimal tax system.
Proposition 9. The tax system T  (B1; K1; x) dened in Proposition 7 implies:
i) E1 K (x) = 0;
ii) E1 (x) = r   E1 B (x) ;
iii) sign ( K (x)   K (x)) = sign ( IWK) ;
iv)  B (x) < 

B (x) ;
v)  B (x) > 

K (x) and 





The average marginal capital tax is zero. Result ii) in proposition 9 implies that the
expected after tax return on any risk-free asset is equal to the expected return on entre-
preneurial capital. This implies that under T , the equilibrium values of r and E1 B (x)
are not separately pinned down. This indeterminacy does not a¤ect the dependence of
marginal bond taxes on x; which is governed by (17). Hence, without loss of generality we
restrict attention to competitive equilibria with r = E1 (x) and E1 B (x) = 0:
Result iii) states that the marginal capital tax is decreasing in capital returns, if the
individual intertemporal wedge is positive, while it is increasing in capital returns if it is
negative. The incentive e¤ects of capital provide intuition for this result. Following the
reasoning in section 2, when IWK > 0; more capital tightens the incentive compatibility
constraint. Hence, the optimal tax system discourages agents from setting K1 too high
by increasing the after tax volatility of capital returns. Instead, for IWK < 0; more
capital relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. The optimal tax system encourages
entrepreneurs to hold capital by reducing the after tax volatility of capital returns. By
result ii), the intertemporal wedge on the bond is equal to the aggregate intertemporal
wedge IW, and hence is positive. Then, higher holdings of B1 tighten the entrepreneurs
incentive compatibility constraints. This explains result iv), that marginal bond taxes are
decreasing in entrepreneurial earnings. The optimal tax system discourages entrepreneurs
from holding B1 in excess of B1 by making bonds a bad hedge against idiosyncratic capital
risk. Finally, result v) states that capital is subsidized with respect to bonds in the bad
state. This results stems from the fact that consumption and entrepreneurial earnings are
positively correlated at the optimal allocation, which means that capital returns and the
inverse of the stochastic discount factor, which pins down marginal taxes, are also positively
correlated. By denition, there is no correlation between bond returns and the inverse of
the stochastic discount factor.
To illustrate the properties of optimal marginal asset taxes, we plot them for the nu-
merical examples analyzed in section 2.2 in gure 2, assuming r = E1 (x). Each row
corresponds to one of the examples, the left panels plot the marginal capital taxes, while
the right panels plot the marginal bond taxes. The solid line plots the intertemporal wedge
for the corresponding asset. The dashed-star line corresponds to marginal taxes in state
x, whereas the dashed-cross line corresponds to optimal marginal taxes in state x: The
vertical scale is in percentage points and is the same for all panels.
The rst example is one in which the individual intertemporal wedge is always negative.
The marginal tax on capital is negative in the low state and positive in the good state,
while the opposite is true for the marginal tax on bonds. Hence, the marginal capital tax is
increasing in earnings, while the marginal bond tax is decreasing in earnings. The second
row corresponds to the example with lower spread in capital returns, which exhibits a posi-
tive individual intertemporal wedge for intermediate values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion : The third row reports the optimal marginal asset taxes for the third example,
in which  is xed and we vary the spread in capital returns. In the second and third
examples, when IWK > 0; the marginal tax on entrepreneurial capital is also decreasing
in x; positive in the bad state and negative in the good state: However, for all examples,
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it is always the case that the marginal tax on capital is smaller than the one on bonds in
the low earnings state, x. In the third example, since the constrained-e¢ cient allocation
only depends on the expected value of capital returns (held constant here) and not on their
spread, the marginal bond tax taxes are constant. Instead, as discussed, the intertemporal
wedge on capital is decreasing in the spread of capital returns.
Despite the fact that wedges are everywhere quite small in percentage terms, the mag-
nitude of marginal taxes is signicant. The capital tax ranges from 2 to 23% in absolute
value, while the bond tax ranges from 0 to 30% in absolute value.
The main nding in the scal implementation for the market structure considered in
this section is the optimality of di¤erential asset taxation. The optimal tax system equalizes
after tax returns on entrepreneurial capital and riskless bonds, thus it reduces the after tax
spread in capital returns and it increases the after tax spread in the returns to the riskless
bond. Consequently, entrepreneurial capital is subsidized relatively to a riskless asset in
the bad state.
These results can be generalized to risky securities: Let r (x) > 0 for x = x; x; denote
the return to a security S1 in zero net supply: Assume that entrepreneurs can trade this
security at price q at time 0: Letting the candidate tax system be given by T (S1; K1; x) =
K (x)K1 + S (x)S1 +  (x) :Set  K (x) and 
 (x) as in (17) and (18) for S1 = 0. Set
marginal taxes on the security according to:




Following a proof strategy similar to that in Proposition 7, it is possible to show that the
resulting tax system implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
The equilibrium price of the security is q =
E1(1+r(x) S(x))
E1(1+x K(x))
12: Then, (20) implies
E1~r (x) = E1x; where ~r (x) is the equilibrium rate of return on this security, ~r (x) =
1+r(x)
q
  1: The intertemporal wedge on the risky security is:
IWS = E1u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + ~r (x))  u0 (c0) ;
Let Corre denote the correlation conditional on  (e) : Then, the following result holds.
Proposition 10. If Cov1 (~r (x) ; x) > 0 and V1 (x) > V1 (~r (x)) ; then:
E1u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + ~r (x)) > E1u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) ;
 S (x)   K (x) < 0 and  S (x)   K (x) > 0:
If Cov1 (~r (x) ; x) > 0 and V1 (x) > V1 (~r (x)) ; Corr1 (~r (x) ; x) 2 (0; 1) : The proposition
states that a security positively correlated with capital with lower variance of returns has
12As in the case with risk-free bonds, the equilibrium expected return on this security is not separately
pinned down from E1s (x).
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Figure 2: Optimal marginal taxes on entrepreneurial capital and bonds.
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a higher intertemporal wedge than capital. An entrepreneur would be willing to hold such
a security instead of capital, since it is associated with lower earnings risk. However, this
has an adverse e¤ect on incentives. This motivates the higher intertemporal wedge and the
fact that  S (x)    K (x) is decreasing in x; which implies that capital is subsidized with
respect to the risky security in the bad state.
This nding points to a general principle. The correlation of an assets returns with
the idiosyncratic risk that determines the assets e¤ects on the entrepreneursincentives to
exert e¤ort and, consequently, the properties of optimal marginal taxes on the asset.
In this implementation, we considered risk-free bonds and other nancial securities in
zero net supply. In the next section, we consider an implementation in which entrepreneurs
can sell shares of their own capital to external investors, thus giving rise to an equity market
with a positive supply of securities.
3.2. Optimal Capital Taxation with External Ownership
We now allow entrepreneurs to sell shares of their capital and buy shares of other entrepre-
neurscapital. Each entrepreneur can be interpreted as a rm, so that this arrangement
introduces an equity market. The amount of capital invested by an entrepreneur can be
interpreted as the size of their rm.
An entrepreneurs budget constraint in each period is :
c0 = K0  K1  
Z
i2[0;1]
S1 (i) di+ sK1; (21)
c1 (x) = K1 (1 + x) sK1 (1 + d (x))+
Z
i2[0;1]
(1 +D (i))S1 (i) di T (K1; s; fS1gi ; x) ; (22)
where s 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of capital sold to outside investors, d (x) denotes dividends
distributed to shareholders, S1 (i) is the value of shares in company i in an entrepreneurs
portfolio and D (i; ~x) denotes dividends earned from each share of company i if the realized
returns are ~x for ~x 2 X: Let D (i) = Ee^D (i; ~x) denote expected returns for stocks in
rm i: Gross stock earnings for an entrepreneur with equity portfolio fS1 (i)gi are given
by
R
i2[0;1] (1 +D (i))S1 (i) di; where D (i) denotes expected dividends from rm i: Since
D (i; ~x) = d (~x) for all i and ~x is i.i.d., D (i) = D for all i = [0; 1] : The dividend distribution
policy is taken as given by the entrepreneurs and the shareholders. This arrangement should
be interpreted as part of the share issuing agreement. Entrepreneurs choose K1; fS1 (i)gi
as well as e¤ort at time 0; taking as given the distribution policy, dividends and taxes.
At time 1; x is realized, dividends are distributed, the government collects taxes and the
entrepreneurs consume. The variables K1; x; S1 (i) ; s and d (x) are public information.




S1 (i) di+ (x) : Here, P (x) can be interpreted as a marginal tax on entrepreneurial
earnings. The marginal tax on stock returns, S (x) ; depends only the realization of x for









(K0; T ) = arg max
e^;K^1;s^;fS^1(i)g
i
u (c0) + Eeu (c1)  v (e) ; (Problem 4)
subject to (21), (22) and
R
i2[0;1] S1 (i) di  B = K1(1+x)(1 P (x)) (x)(1 S(x)) Ri2[0;1](1+D(i))di ; where B is the
natural borrowing limit.
The Euler equations for this problem are:
  (1  s) fu0 (c0)  Ee^ [(1 + x) (1  P (x))u0 (c1 (x))]g (23)
+sEe^ [(1 + x) (1  P (x))  (1 + d (x))]u0 (c1 (x))

= 0 for K1 > 0
 0 for K1 = 0 ;
 u0 (c0) + Ee^ (1 +D (i)  S (x))u0 (c1 (x)) = 0; (24)
[u0 (c0)  Ee^ (1 + d (x))u0 (c1 (x))]K1
8<:
= 0 for s 2 (0; 1)
 0 for s = 0
> 0 for s = 1:
: (25)
We dene a competitive equilibrium for this trading structure and then consider how
to implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
Denition 11. A competitive equilibrium is an allocation
n







with s^ 2 [0; 1] ; a distribution policy d^ (x) and a dividend process D^ (i; x) for i 2 [0; 1] ;









solves the entrepreneursproblem, for given d^ (x) ;
D^ (i; ~x) ; and T ;
ii) the dividend process is consistent with the distribution policy, d^ (x) = D^ (i; x) for all
i and x 2 X;
ii) the stock market clears, s^K^1 = S^1 (i) for i = [0; 1] ;
iii) the resource constraint is satised in each period.
Since all entrepreneurs are ex ante identical, we restrict attention to symmetric equi-
libria in which s; K1 and e¤ort are constant for all entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs face
a portfolio problem in the selection of stocks. Given that all stocks have the same ex-
pected return net of taxes under the family of tax systems dened by T (K1; fS1gi ; x).
entrepreneurs are indi¤erent over which stocks to hold. However, they will always hold
a continuum of stocks, since this ensures that their portfolio has zero variance. To break
the entrepreneurs indi¤erence over portfolio selection, we assume that all entrepreneurs
hold a perfectly di¤erentiated portfolio. Hence, D corresponds to gross portfolio returns in
equilibrium and we can restrict attention to the case S1 (i) = S1 for all i:
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We now construct a tax system that implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
Set the marginal prot tax is  P (x) as follows:




Let d (x) = (1 + x) (1  P (x))  1; so that dividends per share are simply given by after
tax prots. This implies: D = E1 (1 + x) (1   P (x))  1: Set  S (x) so that:




Lastly, we choose  (x) to satisfy:
c1 (x) = K

1 (1 + x) (1   P (x))  sK1 (1 + d (x)) (28)
+
 
1 + D    S (x)

S1    (x) ;
for some s 2 [0; 1); with S1 = sK1 :
We now prove that the tax system T  (K1; fS1 (i)gi ; x) implements the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation.




 (x) ; where  P (x) ; 

S (x) and 
 (x) satisfy (26), (27) and (28), respectively, implements
the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with distribution policy 1+d (x) = (1 + x) (1   P (x))
and dividend processD (i) for all i: The allocation fK1 ; s; fS1 (i)gi ; 1; c1 (x)g with sK1 =
S1 (i) for all i and s
 2 (0; 1); the tax system T  (K1; fS1 (i)gi ; x) ; the distribution policy
d (x) and the dividend process D (i; x) constitute a competitive equilibrium.
The proof proceeds as the one for proposition 7. The values of S1 and s
 are not pinned
down by the implementation. The setting of marginal taxes ensures that the entrepreneurs
Euler equations (23)-(25) are satised as an equality at any s 2 (0; 1) for distribution policy
d (x) ; and that local second order su¢ cient conditions are also satised. It follows that
the only interior solution to the entrepreneursoptimization problem is f1; K1 ; S1 (i)g for
any s 2 (0; 1). In addition, it ensures that the allocation is globally optimal because it
rules out any corner solutions to the entrepreneurs investment and portfolio problems,
irrespective of the level of e¤ort. Lastly, the setting of  (x) ensures high e¤ort is optimal
at the appropriate level of capital and portfolio choices. The optimal tax system does not
pin down the equilibrium value of s. By (23), for s 2 (0; 1), the tax system ensures that
entrepreneurs nd it optimal to choose K1 :
The properties of the optimal tax system can be derived from (26)-(28). First:
E1

P (x) = 1  E1

u0 (c0)




so that E1 P (x) > 0 if IWK > 0 and E1

P (x) < 0 if IWK < 0: However, using the
planners Euler equation delivers E1 (1 + x)  P (x) = 0; since:






This implied that the expected tax paid is zero.13 In addition,  P (x)    P (x) < 0 when
IWK > 0 and  P (x)   P (x) > 0 when IWK < 0 from:
u0 (c0)
 (1 + x)u0 (c1 (x))
  u
0 (c0)
 (1 + x)u0 (c1 (x))
=  P (x)   P (x) ;
since IWK~ (1 + x)u0 (c1 (x))  (1 + x)u0 (c1 (x)) : Lastly, by (27):




This implies E1 S (x) =  E1 P (x) E1x P (x) =  E1 P (x)E1 (1 + x) Cov1 (x;  P (x)).
If IWK ? 0; Cov1 (x;  P (x)) 7 0 and E1 P (x) ? 0; as discussed above. Hence, the sign of
E1

S (x) is typically ambiguous.
Figure 3 plots the optimal marginal asset taxes for this implementation in the three
numerical examples analyzed in section 2.2. The left panels correspond to the marginal
tax on entrepreneurial earnings, while the right panels correspond to the marginal tax
on stocks. The dashed-star line correspond to marginal taxes in the bad state, while the
dashed-cross lines correspond to marginal taxes in the good state. The pattern of optimal
marginal taxes is consistent with the previous discussion.
3.2.1. Double Taxation of Entrepreneurial Capital
The tax system described in proposition 12 embeds a prescription for double taxation of
income from entrepreneurial capital : at the rm level thought  P ; and at the level of
external investors, through  S: This property holds for any equilibrium in which s
 2 (0; 1)
and is jointly determined by the distribution policy and the tax system, since external
investors receive a share of earnings after tax. We now show that this feature of the tax
system necessary to implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
Following the reasoning in section 2, taxation of entrepreneurial earnings and stock
portfolios is required to ensure that entrepreneurs choose K1 and S

1 ; respectively. Absent a
marginal tax on capital, entrepreneurs would have an incentive to increase/reduce holdings
of K1 relative to K1 and reduce e¤ort. Similarly, given that stock returns are uncorrelated
with entrepreneursidiosyncratic risk, the wedge on stock portfolios is positive and, by (29)






0 (c1 (x))  u0 (c0) = IW > 0:
13The constrained-e¢ cient allocation can equivalently be implemented with a marginal tax on tax on
capital K (x) that satises (16) and with distribution policy: 1 + d (x) = 1 + x   K (x) and dividend
process 1 +D (i; ~x) = 1+ ~x  K (~x) ; so that 1 +D (i) = 1+E1 (x) ; since E1K (x) = 0: All other results
can be derived with a similar reasoning.
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Figure 3: Optimal marginal taxes on entrepreneurial earnings and on stocks.
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Hence, absent a tax on stock holdings, entrepreneurs would have the incentive to increase
their holdings of stocks and reduce e¤ort.
We now show that it is necessary to tax distributed earnings to ensure that 0 < s < 1
is chosen. To do this, we allow the marginal tax on distributed earnings,  d (x) to di¤er
from the marginal tax on retained earnings, P (x) : Then, the distribution policy can
be written as: 1 + d (x) = (1 + x) (1   d (x)) : Setting  d (x) = 0 for x 2 X avoids
double taxation of entrepreneurial earnings. By (25), 1 + d (x) = (1 + x) implies: u0 (c0) 
E1 (1 + x)u
0 (c1 (x)) < 0 and s = 0; if the individual intertemporal wedge is positive.
Hence, when IWK > 0 and there is not tax on distributed earnings, s = 0 is the only
implementable value of s: If the individual intertemporal wedge is negative and  d (x) = 0,
(25) implies: u0 (c0) E1 (1 + x)u0 (c1 (x)) > 0 and s = 1. But equation (23) evaluated at
s = 1 reduces to:
 E1 [(1 + x)  P (x)u0 (c1 (x))]  0:
This is clearly a contradiction since when IWK < 0; (1 + x)  P (x) is increasing in x and
Cov1 [(1 + x) 

P (x) ; u
0 (c1 (x))] < 0; which implies E1 [(1 + x) 

P (x)u
0 (c1 (x))] < 0; since
E1 (1 + x) 

P (x) = 0: Hence, there is no interior solution to the entrepreneurs choice ofK1.
It follows that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation cannot be implemented, since there is no
way to set taxes to ensure that a particular value of K1 will be chosen by the entrepreneur.
Even if for any value of K1 (and S1),  (x) can be set to ensure that high e¤ort will be
chosen, there is no way to guarantee that the corresponding value of K1 will indeed arise.
To understand this property, note that an entrepreneur has three intertemporal margins
in this market structure, corresponding to the Euler equation for K1; the one for S1 and
the one for s: Therefore, there are three potential deviations in her asset position and
three intertemporal scal instruments are needed to implement the constrained-e¢ cient
outcomes. For IWK positive, an entrepreneur has an incentive to increase her holdings of
K1 relative to K1 and therefore would optimally not sell any equity under a tax system in
which distributed earnings are not taxed. This simply implies that the only equilibrium is
one in which s = 0: It is still possible to implement K1 and e
: Instead, the case in which
the individual intertemporal wedge is negative is particularly problematic. When IWK < 0;
an entrepreneur would optimally reduce her holdings of capital when she reduces e¤ort.
This can be achieved directly or by increasing the fraction s sold to external investors. As
shown above, if distributed earnings are not taxed, the optimal deviation is s = 1, which
implies K1 and e
 cannot be implemented.
We now characterize the class of tax systems T (K1; s; fS1 (i)gi) that rules out s = 1 as
a possible solution to the entrepreneursproblem can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 13. In any competitive equilibrium under a tax system, T (K1; s; fS1 (i)gi) =
P (x) (1  s)K1 + d (x) sK1+  s (x)
R
i
S1 (i) di+ (x) ; and distribution policy 1+d (x) =
(1 + x) (1   d (x)) ; s 2 [0; 1) if and only if:
Ee^ (1 + d (x))u
0 (c1 (x))  Ee^ (1 + x) (1  P (x))u0 (c1 (x)) : (31)
This proposition states that the expected discounted value of distributed earnings must
be greater than the expected discounted value of retained earnings after tax to ensure that
24
s < 1 in a competitive equilibrium under a tax system T (K1; s; fS1 (i)gi) : For this condition
to be veried at the constrained-e¢ cient allocation, it must be that P (x)   d (x) if
u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) > u
0 (c1 (x
0)) (1 + x0) for x; x0 2 fx; xg : Then, since u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) ?
u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) for IWK ? 0; this implies P (x)   d (x) and  P (x)   d (x) for IWK > 0
and P (x)   d (x) and P (x)   d (x) for IWK < 0:
The rationale for this result is simple. When IWK > 0; entrepreneurs have an incentive
to increase holdings of their own capital and reduce e¤ort at the constrained-e¢ cient allo-
cation. A way to discourage this is to make external capital a good hedge. This is achieved
by making dividend payouts greater in the good state and smaller in the bad state after tax.
Conversely, when IWK < 0; entrepreneurs have an incentive to reduce holdings of their own
capital and e¤ort. To avoid an outcome in which entrepreneurs retain too little ownership,
the tax system reduces the hedging value of external capital, by making dividend payments
higher in the bad state and lower in the good state.
Obviously, under the optimal tax system T  (K1; S1; x) ; distributed and retained earn-
ings are taxed at the same marginal rate  P (x) dened by (26). Thus, it satises (31),
which ensures that s < 1: Moreover, by (25), s > 0: In general, the rst order necessary
conditions for K1 can be rewritten as:
0 =   (1  s) fu0 (c0)  E1 [(1 + x) (1   P (x))u0 (c1 (x))]g
+sE1 [(1 + x) ( d (x)   P (x))u0 (c1 (x))] :
Then, for equilibria with s 2 (0; 1) ; it must be that E1 [(1 + x) ( d (x)   P (x))u0 (c1 (x))]
= 0; if  P (x) satises (26), to ensure that K

1 is chosen.
This argument implies that it is indeed necessary for distributed earnings, as well as
retained earnings, to be taxed at the rm level to implement the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation. Hence, entrepreneurial capital is subject to double taxation in the optimal tax
system.
The linearity in asset levels of the optimal tax system is an important property in the
two previous implementations. It implies that optimal marginal taxes are independent
from the individual level of asset holdings. For example, in the rst implementation,
each unit of the bond B1 is taxed at the same marginal rate  B (x) ; that depends only
on an individuals observable capital returns x: It follows that the government does not
need to observe entrepreneursportfolios to administer the optimal tax system, if nancial
securities are traded via competitive intermediaries and taxes on holding of those securities
are collected at the source. This arrangement is similar to the one in place for consumption
taxes in the US, where merchants observe individual units of consumption and apply a
mandated consumption tax schedule. They then transfer total tax revenues to the relevant
tax authority (the city, county or state for consumption taxes) who only observes the total
revenue inow from each merchant. Similarly, nancial intermediaries clearing trades of
bonds B1 could levy marginal tax  B (x) on an entrepreneur with returns x: Then, if the





Moreover, if each entrepreneurs faces the marginal tax  B (x) on bonds and the marginal






We exploit the linearity of optimal marginal asset taxes to implement the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation in a market structure with unobserved portfolio holdings in the next
section.
3.3. Private Insurance Contracts
We now construct an implementation with private insurance contracts. We assume that
there are a continuum of identical insurance companies that behave competitively. In-
surance companies can be seen as risk neutral agents that dont exert any e¤ort. Each
insurance company writes contracts with a continuum of entrepreneurs and makes zero
prots.
Events occur according to the following timing. At time 0; insurance companies o¤er in-
centive compatible insurance contracts to the entrepreneurs, denoted with C = fP;R (x) ; R (x)g ;
where P is the premium paid at time 0 and R (x) is the state contingent transfer at time
1: Entrepreneurs can only purchase one insurance contract. In addition, entrepreneurs buy
bonds B1 which pay a risk-free interest r; and they invest in capital K1: They then exert
e¤ort. In period 1; x is realized, entrepreneurs receive insurance payments and the govern-
ment levies taxes. Insurance companies are liquidated and their liquidation value, equal to
any prots, is rebated to the entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs then consume.
The informational structure is as follows. The level of investment K1 and x are public
information. We assume that insurance companies and the government do not observe
B1: We restrict attention to candidate tax systems of the form: T (K1; B1; x) =  (x) +
B (x)B1 + K (x)K1:











U (e;K1; B1; C; T )  v(e)  U





~e; ~P ; ~R (x) ; ~K1; ~B1
i
2  (K0) ;
(32)






[e;K1; B1; P; R (x)] : K1 2

0; K0 + 0   P  B1

; B1  B;
R (x)  K1 (1 + x  K (x)) +B1 (1 + r   B (x))   (x) + 1:

(34)
U (e;K1; B1; C; T ) = u
 




K1 (1 + x  K (x)) +B1 (1 + r   B (x)) +R (x)   (x) + 1

;
B is the natural debt limit, and t denotes aggregate prots from the insurance sector in
period t = 0; 1; taken as given by each individual insurance company.
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Constraint (32) is the incentive compatibility constraint. It requires that the e¤ort,
capital and bond allocation specied by the contract is preferred by the agent to any other
feasible e¤ort, capital and bond allocation. Insurance companies cannot observe e¤ort
and bond holdings, but can induce a particular allocation which is incentive compatible.
The entrepreneur takes the tax system, the terms of the insurance contract and the banks
liquidation value as given. Constraint (33) is the zero prot condition imposed on insurance
companies. The set  (K0) describes feasible allocations and contracts. The feasibility
requirements reect the non-negativity constraints in the agents problem.
We assume that entrepreneurs and insurance companies buy bonds from nancial inter-
mediaries that collect taxes on bonds at the source. The cash ow of nancial intermediaries
is denoted with Ft for t = 0; 1; with









(1 + r   [ (e) B (x) + (1   (e)) B (x)]) :
Denition 14. A competitive equilibrium with insurance contracts is given by an ini-
tial endowment of capital K0 for the entrepreneurs, an allocation fe;K1; B1g ; insurance
contracts C; and a tax system T (K1; B1; x) such that:
i) the allocation and loan contracts C solve Problem 4 given the tax system;
ii) the bond market clears, B1 +BI1 = 0;
iii) the resource constraint is satised in each period.
The rst requirement guarantees that the allocation and the corresponding consump-
tion path are optimal for the entrepreneurs, given the tax system and the insurance con-
tracts, since the allocation and contracts are incentive compatible. Insurance companies
are optimizing and make zero prots in equilibrium given that they solve Problem 4. In a
competitive equilibrium, nancial intermediaries obtain a zero cash-ow in each period.
We dene the optimal tax system as the one that implements the allocation that solves




1 (x) ; c

1 (x) ; in a competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 15. Let  K (x) and 

B (x) satisfy (16) and (17) and set 
 (x) = 0 for x =
x; x: Then, the tax system T  (K1; B1; x) =  (x) +  K (x)K1 + 

B (x)B1 implements




1 (x) ; c

1 (x) in the economy with insurance contracts and
unobservable bond holdings with B1 = B
I
1 = 0 and r = E1 (x).
Proposition 15 shows that, by appropriately setting marginal asset taxes, the govern-
ment can relax the more severe incentive compatibility constraint (32) that arises in the
contracting problem between private insurance companies and entrepreneurs, due entre-
preneursunobserved holdings of nancial assets, thus enabling private insurance contracts
to implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with observable consumption. The proof
proceeds in three steps. First, it is shown that the optimal insurance problem with ob-
served B1 is just the dual of the the planning problem (Problem 1). Then, we show that
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the incentive compatibility constraint (32) in Problem 5 is equivalent to the incentive com-
patibility constraint (3) in Problem 1 plus the Euler equations for capital and bonds under
T : The last step involves proving that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is feasible for
this modied version of Problem 5.
This result has important implications for the role of taxes in implementing alloca-
tions. Under this market structure, entrepreneurs entertain an exclusive relationship with
one insurance company. If the entrepreneursbond holding were observed by the insurer,
the optimal contract would implement the constrained e¢ cient allocation in a competi-
tive equilibrium where insurance companies make zero prots. The entrepreneursability
to invest in bonds breaks this exclusivity, since it allows for trades that cannot be con-
trolled or observed by insurance rms. This generates an essential role for asset taxation
at the optimal marginal rates. Even if the government does not have any informational
advantages with respect to private insurance rms, it can set and enforce taxes on assets
to inuence the entrepreneurs intertemporal decisions. The optimal asset taxes partly
relax the entrepreneursincentive compatibility constraint in the optimal insurance prob-
lem. In the words of Arnott and Stiglitz (1990), the governments "power to tax" and
"monopoly on compulsion" allows for the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with observed in-
dividual consumption to implemented as a competitive equilibrium in a market structure
where individual consumption remains private.
These ndings are most closely related to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), who analyze s-
cal implementations in a Mirrleesian economy with unobserved consumption due to hidden
side trades. They show that private insurance contracts do not implement constrained-
e¢ cient allocations in that setting, because private insurers fail to internalize the e¤ect of
the contracts they o¤er on the equilibrium price of the unobservable side trades. A linear
tax on capital can ameliorate this competitive equilibrium externality. Their optimal tax
system implements the constrained-e¢ cient allocation with unobservable consumption. In
the market structure presented here, the tax system implements the constrained-e¢ cient
allocation with observable consumption, despite the fact that in the market economy the
bond holdings are unobserved by the government and by private insurance rms, which
implies that individual consumption remains private.14
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes optimal taxation of entrepreneurial capital in a dynamic moral hazard
model with idiosyncratic capital risk.15 First, we characterize the properties of constrained-
e¢ cient allocations and show that the intertemporal wedge on entrepreneurial capital can
14Bizer and DiMarzo (1999) derive a related result in a moral hazard model in which agents may borrow.
They show that as long as debt repayments can be made state contingent by allowing for default, it is
possible to implement the optimal e¤ort allocation with observable savings, even if borrowing is unobserved
by the principal, who designs the incentive-compatible salary policy.
15This class of environments has not been studied in the recursive contracting literature. An exception is
Kahn and Ravikumar (1999) where idiosyncratic capital returns are hidden. They focus on an implemen-
tation with nancial intermediaries and rely on numerical simulations. They do no provide an analytical
characterization of the wedges associated with the constrained-e¢ cient allocation.
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be positive or negative. A negative intertemporal wedge signals that more capital relaxes
the incentive compatibility constraint. This can occur since the returns from e¤ort are
increasing in capital. The main contribution of the paper is to characterize the optimal tax
systems that implement the constrained-e¢ cient allocation in di¤erent market structures
with multiple assets. We derive three results. First, marginal asset taxes depend on
the correlation of their returns with the entrepreneursidiosyncratic capital risk. We also
consider whether entrepreneurial capital earnings distributed to outside investors should be
taxed at the rm level. We nd that entrepreneurial capital should be taxed at the rm level
and again when it accrues to outside investors in the form of stock returns. This generates
a theory of optimal di¤erential asset taxation and provides a foundation for the double
taxation of capital earnings. Lastly, we show that, even if private insurance contracts are
available, it is essential to tax assets to implement constrained-e¢ cient allocations when
entrepreneurs can trade bonds and their asset holdings are private. This points to an
important complementarity between private contracting and taxation.
The empirical public nance literature has documented substantial di¤erences in the
tax treatment of di¤erent forms of capital income. Specically, interest income is taxed at a
higher rate than stock returns, as discussed in Gordon (2003), while dividends are taxed at a
higher rate than realized capital gains. As documented by Gordon and Slemrod (1988), the
higher marginal tax rate on interest income is a stable property of empirical tax systems in
many industrialized economies. These studies focus mainly on di¤erences in average taxes.
Instead, the theory developed in this paper generates predictions on the correlation of
marginal asset taxes with individual earnings, and average taxes do not play an important
role. Poterba (2002) documents a strong response of household portfolio composition to
this di¤erential tax treatment. Auerbach (2002) nds that rmss investment decisions
appear to be sensitive to the taxation of dividend income at the personal level and their
choice of organization form is responsive to the di¤erential between corporate and personal
tax rates. In the economy studied in this paper, the optimal tax system implements the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation by inuencing portfolio choice and sales of private equity
by entrepreneurs. Di¤erential tax treatment of di¤erent asset classes is essential to achieve
this goal.
The incentive problem that arises with entrepreneurial capital arguably also applies to
top executives who hold company stock and other assets. Hence, this analysis could be
adapted to such a setting. A quantitative version of the model can be used to provide an
assessment of empirical tax systems. Lastly, this model does not consider entrepreneurial
entry. By introducing ex ante heterogeneity in private entrepreneurial abilities, it would be
possible to analyze optimal selection into entrepreneurship and optimal income and capital
taxation in a model with workers and entrepreneurs. We leave these extensions for future
work.
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5. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Letting  be the multiplier on the incentive compatibility
constraint and  the one on the resource constraint, the rst order necessary conditions for
the planning problem at e = 1 are:
 u0 (K0  K1) + E1 (1 + x) = 0;
(1   (1)) u0 (c1 (x))   ( (1)   (0)) u0 (c1 (x))   (1   (1)) = 0;
 (1) u0 (c1 (x))   ( (0)   (1)) u0 (c1 (x))   (1) = 0:
At e = 0; the same rst order necessary conditions hold with  = 0: If e = 1 is optimal,
the rst order conditions can be simplied to yield (4) and (5).




1(x) < (1 + x)K

1 :
Consider a class of perturbations to the optimal allocation that increase consumption in the
bad state by c1 and reduce consumption in the good state by c1; and preserve incentive
compatibility and feasibility. Such perturbations must satisfy:
( (1)   (0)) [ u0 (c1 (x))c1 + u0 (c1(x))c1] = 0;
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the latter is always satised for  (1)  1=2: Now let c1 (x) + c1  K1 (1 + x) : Then:
c1 (x) c1 = c1 (x) c1
u0 (c1(x))
u0 (c1 (x))






1 (1 + x)  (1   (1)) c1 (x)
 (1)
  [K1 (1 + x)  c1 (x)]
u0 (c1(x))
u0 (c1 (x))










[K1 (1 + x)  c1 (x)]











 0: Hence, this perturbation is incentive compatible, uses
fewer resources than the optimal allocation at time 1 and implies that consumption in the
good/bad state is smaller/greater than earnings. Since the perturbed allocation uses fewer
resources at time 1; it is feasible to increase consumption at time 0 by reducing the level
of K1 by the amount:
K1 =
c1









The resulting e¤ect on welfare is:


































E1 (1 + x)
2 (1)
u0 (c1 (x))
+ 1  2 (1)

= c1u
0 (c1(x)) 2 (1) (1   (1))
u0 (c0)








where the third and fourth equality use the inverted Euler equation. Hence, the class
perturbations that make consumption in the good/bad state is smaller/greater than earn-
ings is incentive compatible, requires fewer resources and increases welfare. This vio-
lates the assumption that fK1 ; c1 (x)g was optimal and satises (1 + x)K1 < c1(x) and




Proof of Proposition 3. By equation (9), IWK ~ u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)  u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) :
By Lemma 2, (1 + x)K1  c1(x) > c1(x)  (1 + x)K1 with at least one inequality strict.
Then:
IWK ~ [u0(c1(x))(1 + x)  u0(c1(x))(1 + x)]K1
< u0(c1(x))c

1(x)  u0(c1(x))c1(x)  0
if u0 (c) c is weakly increasing in c: Since
@u0 (c) c
@c
= u00 (c) c+ u0 (c) > 0;
for  (c)  1; the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 6. We rst show that under T ; B^1 and K^1 cannot both be interior.
Suppose not. If optimal bond and capital holdings under T are interior:
u0 (c^0) = E0u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + r   B) ;
u0 (c^0) = E0u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x  K) :
But:




0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)
E1u0 (c1 (x))
  E0u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)
E0u0 (c1 (x))





is increasing in e if IWK < 0 and decreasing for IWK > 0: Contra-
diction. Then, if IWK < 0; and B^1 is interioir, (35) implies K^1 = 0: If instead IWK > 0;
assume that B^1 is interior and K^1 = 0. Then, (35) implies that an entrepreneur would
like to increase capital holdings further. Since this can always be achieved by reducing
bond holdings, an interior value of B1 cannot be optimal. Hence, if IWK > 0 it must be
that B^1 =B and K^1 > 0 under T : Moreover, by (14), K^1 > K1 : The binding Incentive
compatibility constraint implies that such a deviation obtains higher lifetime utility for the
agent.
Proof of Proposition 7. We want to show thatn
e^; K^1; B^1
o
(B0 ; K0; T
) = (1; K1 ; B

1) ;




(B0 ; K0; T
) 6= (1; K1 ; B1) : Ifn
e^; K^1; B^1
o















irrespective of the value of e^; a contradiction. Since after tax
returns are equated for capital and bonds, agents are indi¤erent between any portfolio
allocation such that total wealth at the beginning of period 1 is K1 +B

1 : Moreover, at T
;
the local su¢ cient conditions for optimality are also satised irrespective of the value of
e^: To see this, consider the sub-optimization problem associated with the choice of B1 and
K1 for given e. The elements of the Hessian, HU ; for this problem are:
UBB (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x)) (1 + r    B (x))2  0;
UKK (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x)) (1 + x   K (x))2  0;
UBK (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x)) (1 + r    B (x)) (1 + x   K (x)) ;
where Uxy denotes a cross-partial derivative with respect to the variables x; y:Under (16)-
(17), jHU j = 0: Hence, the Hessian is negative semi-denite irrespective of the value of
e^: We now consider values of K^1; B^1 that are not interior. The Inada conditions exclude
non-interior solutions that result from the non-negativity constraint on time 0 consumption
being binding. Hence, there are two candidate non-interior solutions: K^1 = 0 and B^1 > 0;
and K^1 > 0 and B^1 = B: In both cases, one of the Euler equations must hold with equality













This is a contradiction, since (36) and (37) clearly cannot hold at the same time. Then,
K1 ; B






 (x) implies e^ = 1
since the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is incentive compatible. Hence, the allocation
f1; K1 ; B1g is optimal for the agent given the initial endowments B0 ; K0; the tax system
T ; and the interest rate r:
Proof of Corollary 8. By Proposition 7, for any r  0 and B1  B, the allocation
fc0; 1; K1 ; B1 ; c1 (x) ; c1 (x)g solves the agentsoptimization problem in the market economy






1 the bond market
clears and the resource constraint is satised at time 0: The resource constraint at time
1 is satised by construction. Hence, by (18), E1c1 (x) = K1E1 (1 + x) + B

1 (1 + r)  
E1T
 (K1 ; B

1 ; x) ; so that the government budget constraint is satised at time 1.
Proof of Proposition 9. By (16):
E1








which from (5) implies i). ii) follows from the planners Euler equation, since:
E1











K(x)  u0(c1(x)) K(x) = u0(c1(x))(1 + x)  u0(c1(x))(1 + x):
Since:
sign [u0(c1(x))(1 + x)  u0(c1(x))(1 + x)] = sign (-IWK)
and u0(c1(x)) < u
0(c1(x)); iii) follows. iv) follows directly from (16) and u
0 (c1 (x)) <
u0 (c1 (x)) : To show v) note that (16) and (17) imply 

B (x)   K (x) = E1x  x:
Proof of Proposition 10. This follows from:
E1u
0 (c1 (x)) (1 + ~r (x))  E1u0 (c1 (x)) (1 + x) = Cov1 (u0 (c1 (x)) ; ~r (x))  Cov1 (u0 (c1 (x)) ; x)
= Cov1 (u
0 (c1 (x)) ; ~r (x)  x) :
Cov1 (u
0 (c1 (x)) ; ~r (x)  x) > 0 if ~r (x) x is decreasing in x; or Cov1 (~r (x)  x; x) < 0: By
the denition of covariance and by the fact that E1x = E1~r (x):
Cov1 (~r (x)  x; x) = E1~r (x)x  E1x2 = Cov1 (~r (x) ; x)  V1 (x) : (38)
By V1 (x) > V1 (~r (x)) and Cov1 (~r (x) ; x) > 0; 0 < Corr1 (~r (x) ; x) < 1: Then:
Cov1 (~r (x) ; x)  V1 (x) = SD1 (x) [Corr1 (~r (x) ; x)SD1 (~r (x))  SD1 (x)] < 0:
In addition,  S (x)  K (x) = ~r (x) x: Since ~r (x) x is decreasing in x and E1~r (x) = E1x;
 S (x)   K (x) < 0 and  S (x)   K (x) > 0:








(K0; T ) 6= f1; K1 ; s; fsK1gig
















Then, K^1 (1  s^) +
R










; irrespective of the value of e^: Contradiction. Hence, the only interior
solution to (23)-(25) is fK1 ; s; fsK1gig for s 2 (0; 1): In addition, at T  the local second
order su¢ cient conditions are satised. To see this, consider the sub-optimization problem
associated with the choice of fS1 (i)gi and K1 for given e. In the symmetric equilibria we
are considering, expected returns are the same for all stocks and we can restrict attention
to the choice of S1; where S1 (i) = S1 for all i = [0; 1] : The elements of the Hessian, HU ;
for this problem are:
UBB (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x))
 
1 + D    S (x)
2  0;
UKK (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x)) (1 + x)
2 (1   P (x))2  0;
UBK (e^) = u
00 (c0) + Ee^u
00 (c1 (x))
 
1 + D    S (x)

(1 + x) (1   P (x)) ;
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where Uxy denotes a cross-partial derivative with respect to the variables x; y:Under (26)-
(27), jHU j = 0: Hence, the Hessian is negative semi-denite irrespective of the value of
e^: We now consider values of K^1; S^1 that are not interior. The Inada conditions exclude
non-interior solutions that result from the non-negativity constraint on time 0 consumption
being binding. Hence, there are two candidate non-interior solutions: K^1 = 0 and S^1 > 0;
and K^1 > 0 and S^1 = B: In both cases, of the two Euler equations for K1 and S1; one holds













Moreover, (25) implies s^ = 0. This is a contradiction, since (39) and (40) clearly cannot
hold at the same time. Then, K1 ; S

1 are globally optimal irrespective of the value of
e^ for some s 2 [0; 1): Moreover, at K1 ; S1 ;  (x) implies e^ = 1 since the constrained-
e¢ cient allocation is incentive compatible. Hence, f1; K1 ; s; fsK1gig is optimal for the
agent given the initial endowment K0; the tax system T ; and the distribution policy
d (x) ; which implies expected return process D: It follows that the resulting allocation,
fc0; 1; K1 ; s; fsK1gi ; c1 (x)g ; jointly with the distribution policy d (x) and the resulting
expected return process D constitute a competitive equilibrium, according to denition
11.
Proof of Proposition 13. Suppose that the distribution policy is d^ (x) and that
Ee^

1 + d^ (x)

u0 (c1 (x)) 6= Ee^ (1 + x) (1  P (x))u0 (c1 (x)) for some tax system where








; e^; c^1 (x)
o
; with K^1 > 0: If Ee^

1 + d^ (x)

u0 (c1 (x)) >
Ee^ (1 + x) (1  P (x))u0 (c1 (x)) ; for some 0 < s^ < 1; we can write:
0 =  u0 (c^0) (1  s^) + Ee^
h
(1 + x) (1  ^P (x)) 















which implies 0 > u0 (c^0)   E1

1 + d^ (x)

u0 (c^1 (x)) : But by (25), s^ = 0: Contradiction.
Similarly, if Ee^

1 + d^ (x)

u0 (c1 (x)) < Ee^ (1 + x) (1  P (x))u0 (c1 (x)) for some 0 < s^ <
1:
0 =  u0 (c^0) (1  s^) + Ee^
h
(1 + x) (1  ^P (x)) 















Then, u0 (c^0)  E1

1 + d^ (x)

u0 (c^1 (x)) > 0; which by (25) implies s^ = 1: Contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 15. We construct a competitive equilibrium in which the allocation




1 (x) ; c

1 (x) ; bond holdings are B

1 = 0 and the equilibrium rate of return
on bonds is r = E1 (x) : In this equilibrium, P  = BI1 = 0: To characterize the optimal
insurance contracts, we consider a relaxed version of Problem 5, in which the incentive
compatibility constraint (32) is replaced by the set of constraints:
( (1)   (0)) u  K1 (1 + x  K (x)) +R (x) +B1 (1 + r   B (x))   (x) + 1(41)








0  K1 (1 + x  K (x)) +R (x) +Bi1 (1 + r   B (x))   (x) + 1 (1 + x  K (x)) ;
u0
 




0  K1 (1 + x  K (x)) +R (x) +B1 (1 + r   B (x))   (x) + 1 (1 + r   B (x)) :
These constraints are the rst order conditions for an agents optimization problem embed-
ded in constraint (32). We refer to the contracting problem under (41)-(43) as Problem 6.
We construct a solution to Problem 6 under a candidate optimal tax system and then we
show that this solution also solves Problem 5. Then, (42) and (43) will be satised at c0;




0 are feasible for B

1 = 0: Let P
 = BI1 = 0 and set R
 (x) satisfy:
c1 (x) = K

1 (1 + x   K (x)) +R (x) +B1 (1 + r    B (x))   (x) : (44)
R (x) is clearly feasible for the insurance companies, since (41)-(43) are satised at the
constrained-e¢ cient allocation. In addition, 1 = 0: We need to show that it is indeed
optimal. The insurersproblem at  K (x) and 

B (x) and 
 (x) can be rewritten with a




Ee [K1 (1 + x   K (x))  c1 (x)]
1 + r
  (c0 +K1  K0)

;
by substituting the agents budget constraints in each period, since t is taken as given.
The level of B1 does not matter for the value of this objective. Let I0 = K0  K1   c0 and
I1 (x) = K1 (1 + x)  c1 (x) : Consider the problem:









It  0; t = 0; 1;
u (c0)  v (e) + Eeu (c1 (x))  U; (45)
and (3). The variables It; for t = 0; 1 are economy resources net of consumption in each
period. Hence, for 1= (1 + r) = 1=E1 (1 + x) Problem 7 can be interpreted as a dual plan-
ning problem in which the planner minimizes the resource cost of providing a consumption
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allocation to the agent, subject to an incentive compatibility constraint and a participation
constraint.
We now proceed in several steps. First, we show that for U = U (K0) ; the solution




1 (x). Suppose not, let
h
~e; ~K1; ~c0; ~c1 (x)
i
solve Problem 7
at 1= (1 + r) = 1=E1 (1 + x) and U = U (K0) with
h
~e; ~K1; ~c0; ~c1 (x)
i
6= [1; K1 ; c0; c1 (x)] :h
~e; ~K1; ~c0; ~c1 (x)
i
is clearly feasible for Problem 1. Moreover, by (45) it attains the maxi-
mum for Problem 1: Given that Problem 1 has a strictly concave objective with a convex
constraint set, the solution is unique. Hence,
h
~e; ~K1; ~c0; ~c1 (x)
i
must solve Problem 1: Con-




1 (x)] solves Problem 7, which is a relaxed version of Problem
6, since (3) is the incentive compatibility constraint when B1 is observable. In addition,




1 (x) and B

1 = 0 =
0 = P
 satisfy (42) and (43) under the tax system







 = 1; given P  and R (x) ; they solve
Problem 6; since they are optimal for Problem 7; which is less constrained: To see that they
also solve Problem 5; note that following the arguments the the proof of proposition 7, we





and B1 = 0 are globally optimal. In addition, R





and B1 = 0 are feasible for problem 5; given P and R
 (x) ; and will be optimal for Problem
5, since they are the solution to a relaxed problem.
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